The Nonviolent Legacies of Rebel Group Origins

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Word count: 10,182

Abstract

Violent nonstate actors are increasingly seen as engaging in a diverse set of tactics, including nonviolent resistance. The use of nonviolent tactics by rebels complicates our understanding of rebels as primarily violent challengers to the state. What determines rebel groups' use of nonviolent tactics? Extant research explains this tactical choice with mobilization potential and incentives that external actors create. We propose an alternative, organization-centric approach. Shifting the focus to the role of organizational legacies in tactics decisions, we argue that rebel groups' tactical choice between violent and nonviolent contention is influenced by the type of parent organization it descends from. Rebel groups inherit organizational capacities, behavioral norms, and personnel from parent organizations. These factors shape decisions on and norms with respect to the use of contentious tactics. We contend that groups with nonviolent parent organizations should be more likely to engage in nonviolent tactics, and should do so earlier in conflict, than those with other types of parent organizations, as they inherit organizational repertoires comprised of peaceful practices, norms against violence, and members socialized into nonviolent contentious politics. We test our argument using a quantitative research design with the newly updated SRDP dataset on self-determination groups' tactics and the FORGE dataset on rebel group origins. We find that rebels with roots in organizations that used nonviolence are more likely to employ nonviolent tactics and use these tactics significantly earlier in wartime than rebels with other types of parent organizations.

Keywords: nonviolent tactics, rebel behavior, civil war

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Introduction

Rebel groups are primarily identified by their use of anti-systemic violence against established states. Such groups bring a wide variety of claims against governments, at times seeking specific political reforms, total regime change, or even full political separation or secession of part of the state's territory. While defined by their use of violence against the state, rebel groups use a variety of other tactics, including terrorist attacks (Fortna, 2015; Thomas, 2014), governance activities to manage, control and sometimes serve local populations (Arjona, 2016; Arjona et al., 2015; Kasfir et al., 2017; Z. Mampilly & Stewart, 2021; Z. C. Mampilly, 2011; Stewart, 2021), as well as engaging in international diplomacy (Coggins, 2015; Huang, 2016).

Rebel groups also frequently engage in nonviolent tactics: almost 60% of rebel groups use nonviolence at some point during existence.[1] The Revolutionary Front for an Independent East Timor (Fretilin) engaged in substantial armed conflict with the Indonesian state while also employing nonviolent resistance, ultimately at a mass scale. Yet other rebel groups only engage in smaller scale nonviolent events, such as the Eelam People's Revolutionary Liberation Front's (LTTE) use of political noncooperation in Sri Lanka, which included Member of Parliament protest walkouts ("Sri Lanka Tamil Mps Walk Out of Parliament", 1989). Similarly, the Free Aceh Movement (GAM) engaged in economic and political noncooperation, including calls for a general strike and election boycotting ("Strike Called by Aceh Separatists Continues in Pidie", 1999; "Student Watchdog Says Indonesian Polls Free and Fair", 1999).

Understanding the dynamics of rebel use of nonviolence matters for several reasons. First, nonviolence as a practice is argued to have the potential to transform conflict (Vinthagen, 2015). As such, rebels' adoption of nonviolent tactics may signal shifts in underlying support for new or different conflict management attempts. Second, rebels using nonviolent tactics have the potential to draw support from a variety of different au-

[1] This number is taken from our sample.

diences. Work on social movements more broadly has identified conditions under which nonviolent tactics can enhance the reputation of and support for actors that employ these tactics (Manekin & Mitts, 2022; Thurber, 2018) and studies of armed actors specifically show that some nonviolent tactics can elicit support for rebels (Arves et al., 2019).

In this article we present a novel argument about how the organizational legacies of rebel groups affect their propensity to adopt nonviolent tactics when they are in conflict. We argue that the organizations that rebels emerge from often confer lasting norms of behavior and organizational repertoires that have downstream impacts on tactical choices. We test our argument using the Foundations of Rebel Emergence (FORGE) data on rebel origins (Braithwaite & Cunningham, 2020) and the Strategies of Resistance Data Project (SRDP) on nonviolent tactics by actors involved in disputes over national self-determination (Cunningham et al., 2020). We find that rebels which emerge from nonviolent parent organizations are more likely to use nonviolence during their violent challenge to the state, and do so earlier in conflict, compared to groups with other types of parent organizations.

We make several contributions to existing work. First, we advance novel mechanisms to explain the incentives that rebel leaders face for engaging in nonviolent tactics during wartime. Additionally, focusing on the dynamics of rebel origins highlights a visible feature of rebel actors that scholars and practitioners of peacebuilding can use to understand which actors may be more amenable to de-escalation. The study also brings into focus rebels as actors we define by their predominant use of violence and potentially important actors for understanding the trajectories and dynamics of nonviolent resistance more generally.

Nonviolent Tactics in Conflict Contexts

While a number of studies have addressed tactical variation of rebel groups in terms of types of violence (Oswald et al., 2020; Thaler, 2024; Welsh, 2023) and governance behavior

(Breslawski, 2021; Rubin, 2020), few have looked directly at rebel use of nonviolent tactics. Keller (2017, p. 11) notes that rebel use of nonviolence was a "phenomenon [that] has received almost no scholarly attention." This conclusion was, in part, a product of her focus on large-scale nonviolent action of the type addressed by Chenoweth and Stephan's (2011) NAVCO project. Keller (2017) suggests that for a rebel group to also engage in mass-nonviolence, it must be centralized, guided by political leadership and successfully link civilian supporters in urban areas with rebel leadership in the periphery.[2] Also examining large-scale mobilization, Dudouet (2013, p. 402) suggests that we can understand tactical change as a form of de-escalation, where groups "evolve from armed strategies to nonviolent methods of contentious collective action." She offers a set of internal and relational drivers for de-escalation, including internal power shifts, changes in popular demands and changes in external support.

Casting a wider net in terms of nonviolent action, we find that several works do engage with this question to some degree. The initial SRDP release shows that a great deal of nonviolent action takes place in the context of violent conflict (Cunningham et al., 2020). An analysis of tactical choice among a broad set of organizations suggests that organizational capabilities, within-movement competition and resource requirements for nonviolent strategies shape who uses nonviolence (Cunningham et al., 2020). Further, Leventoğlu and Metternich (2018) find that when rebel group fighting triggers the urban middle-class to mobilize for anti-government protest, the likelihood of peace agreements, negotiations and government concessions increases. However, these studies do not specifically look at rebels using these nonviolent tactics.

Krtsch (2021) looks explicitly at the use of general strikes, a type of nonviolent tactic, arguing that strikes can be used to help rebels maintain authority over the local population and are used in response to recent battlefield losses. In contrast, Hillesund and Holterman (2024) look at a wider set of nonviolent tactics globally (building on the SRDP) and find

[2]Keller (2017) has additional hypotheses about the overlap between rebel institutions and social networks, as well as task differentiation within the organization.

that rebels are more likely to use nonviolence after successes on the battlefield. Other work suggests that gender-inclusive ideology affects tactical choice, making organizations more likely to use protest as opposed to violence (Asal et al., 2013). Examining tactical changes among violent and nonviolent tactics, Sims (2022) finds that the connections between organizations shape their choices as they learn from one another.

As most of these studies note, there has been a relative dearth of empirical work on the use of nonviolence by rebels in the context of civil war. Extant theories explain rebels' use of nonviolent tactics with organizational capacity and learning, battlefield dynamics, and ideology. We build on this growing body of work, and propose a logic of nonviolent tactical choice that centers organizational legacies as a key explanatory variable. Specifically, we argue that a rebel group's choice of nonviolent tactics is influenced by the type of parent organization it descends from.

Organizational Legacies and the Use of Nonviolent Tactics

In line with a growing body of research (Z. C. Mampilly, 2011; Parkinson & Zaks, 2018; Staniland, 2014), our theory conceives of rebel groups as organizations and we link behavior during conflict to intra-organizational dynamics. We begin with two basic assumptions. First, we assume that "rebels" share both commonalities and differences in their emergence process. Most nascent rebels tend to begin with smaller acts of violence (Malone, 2022) and often rely on clandestine practices as they grow (Lewis, 2023). The extent to which groups retain culture, personnel, and organizational operations will likely vary across rebel groups. Malone (2022) finds commonalities within three groupings of rebels using Principal Component Analysis, including rebels that emerge from parties (especially leftist parties), those that seek secession, and those associated with transnational Islamism. Yet, there are likely also differences in the initial conditions for these groups at their start, which might derive from government responses to them, or the involvement of third parties offering support and potentially bringing their own agendas to the table

(Salehyan et al., 2011).

Second, we assume that rebel leaders play a central role in determining the use of nonviolent tactics. Unlike some violent tactics, such as targeting civilians or wartime sexual violence, the use of nonviolent tactics is not likely to be the result of indiscipline among soldiers.[3] Consistent with existing studies, we argue that rebel leaders' decision to use nonviolence is made with an eye toward achieving their political goals and mobilizing the resources at hand. Previous research shows that organizational legacies create path dependencies for violent mobilization (Ahram, 2016; Daly, 2012; Lewis, 2023; Osorio et al., 2021) and have an effect on group strategy and tactical choices. Building on these insights, we argue that nonviolent parent organizations endow their rebel group successors with three distinct features that make the use of nonviolent tactics more likely compared to groups without these parent organizations.

First, rebel groups with nonviolent parent organizations inherit personnel with experience in using nonviolent tactics, making mobilization for these tactics easier than if members had no experience with nonviolence. This applies to both social movement leaders-turned-rebel commanders as well as the rank and file. The links between movement leaders and rebel leaders is often explicit, with leaders serving as founders of the rebel group. Work on wartime terrorism has also shown that leader experiences shape their willingness to use this tactic, shaping their knowledge base and innate willingness to engage in violence (Doctor et al., 2024).

The exact nature of how many members make the transition from prior organizations to rebels, and the process through which they do so, likely varies across rebel groups. Several works, however, have identified pre-existing connections, such as those gained by shared membership in a movement or organization, as key determinants of how and why people participate (Daly, 2016; Pearlman, 2011). The role of pre-existing connections for recruitment into the rebel group are likely to be essential for the transition to an armed

[3]Civilian abuse can be the result of both intention and lack of control (Valentino et al., 2004; Weinstein, 2007).

actor, as the initial development of rebel groups often benefits from secrecy and avoidance of government oversight (Lewis, 2023). Consistent and long-term personal experience with nonviolent action makes future use of the tactics less labor intensive for the group, as experience shapes preferences for their use in the future and group members have the skills to carry them out (Finkel, 2015). Moreover, nonviolent parent organizations, as compared to armed actors, may have a greater base of individuals to draw from for future rebel recruitment.

For example, the organization preceding the formation of the Kurdish Workers Party (PKK) in Turkey was the Ankara Democratic Higher Education Association (ADYÖD). The executive leadership of ADYÖD (Nasuh Mitap, Yaşar Gören and Abdullah Öcalan) were central to the PKK's founding. The student organization also contributed rank and file members to the emerging rebel organization. Jongerden (2023, p. 128) notes that "among the Association's members at [that] time are students who would play an important role in the establishment of the PKK." Similarly, the students of EKIN in the Basque region of Spain comprised a central component of the initial members of ETA, along with members of EGI (Euzko Gaztedi) – the youth wing of the Basque National Party (Tejerina, 2001, pp. 41–42).

This latent capacity to engage in nonviolence stemming from the continuation of personnel from a nonviolent parent increases the likelihood that group commanders see the use of nonviolent tactics as advantageous and appropriate. This is the most direct inheritance an organization receives from its predecessor, yet can also be impacted by swift changes in the group, particularly if there is high member turnover. When a nonviolent social group takes up arms and transforms into an armed organization, it may lose members who oppose violent contention, it can lose fighters quickly in battle, or it may suffer factionalization. Hence, the inheritance of leadership and personnel with expertise in nonviolence is likely to be only one factor influencing the use of nonviolence.

Second, rebel groups with nonviolent parents inherit organizational routines which

may lead to the continuing production of nonviolent tactics by the rebel group as an organization. Organizations are path-dependent and solve problems by relying on a predefined repertoire of action to address them (Allison, 1969; Weinstein, 2007). The preferences of individual commanders will also be shaped by organizational knowledge, capabilities and routines. For example, a social movement may have dedicated committees for planning strikes and demonstrations and possess an infrastructure of local cells or offices to disseminate information to civilians it seeks to mobilize. Parkinson (2013) demonstrates that member connections and competencies that predated rebellion played a key role in the functioning of rebel groups, looking not at military actions but at resupply, logistics and finance.

Returning to the example of the EKIN student group, an ETA predecessor, Clark (1979, p. 156) notes that in its early stages "the group began to publish a typewritten and mimeographed newsletter titled 'Ekin,' from which they subsequently took the name for the group itself." The centrality of leafleting carried over to the creation of ETA. McCreanor (2016, p. 74) reports that "at the first Biltzar Nagusia (General Assembly) in 1962, ETA deemed propaganda to be its most urgent issue." This capacity and experience also appears to have affected the structure of ETA. The rebel group was organized into six parts: publications, study groups, Basque language group, mass actions, propaganda and military actions. Among these, the group "initially concentrated its activities on propaganda (calls on patriots to join the struggle) and sabotage (murals, displays of Basque flags, leaflets, small explosive devices)" (Aiartza & Zabalo, 2010, p. 13).

A rebel group successor inherits these structures that are geared towards the production of specific tactics. Repertoires of nonviolent action are thus transmitted from one organization to the next, as the organization converts to an armed group, and these repertoires are likely to be somewhat sticky. This has been found for violent tactics being transmitted from one organization to its successor (Daly, 2012) and we expect that the same holds for nonviolent tactics as well.

Third, nonviolent parentage leads to the transmission of behavioral norms and organizational culture rooted in nonviolence which can further increase the chance that rebels will utilize nonviolent tactics. The values an organization or movement instills in members via training and general organizational culture is important for combatant and commander attitudes and directly influences the group's repertoire of action, i.e., the menu of courses of action from which members of the organization routinely choose (Hoover Green, 2018; Tilly, 1993). Whereas the second feature pertains to organizational structure, this feature centers on organizational culture and member socialization, which we argue is also important for determining tactical choice. Rebel groups with nonviolent parents may not only continue to use nonviolent tactics because its members have the skills to do so due to prior experience, but also because the organization has inherited a culture and value system that leads to new members being trained in the skills necessary to use nonviolent tactics in the future.

Identifying organizational norms and culture can be a challenging endeavor, particularly as they may be related to the practice of nonviolence. The principles of nonviolence are often linked to democratic practice in decision making and to inclusiveness (Rani, 2012).[4] Such norms are evident in nonviolent parents of rebel organizations. For example, the motto of the Mecha and Tulama Self-Help Association (MTSHA), the predecessor of the Oromo Liberation Front (OLF), was "love your brothers as you love yourself; things that you would like others to do for you, do them for others" (Dugassa, 2008, p. 117). The MTSHA also followed a more inclusive ideology, including non-Oromo members (Zewde, 2014, p. 194). Other nonviolent rebel parent organizations demonstrate this inclusiveness, including the Karen National Association, a predecessor to the Karen National Union (KNU) in Myanmar (Worland, 2010, p. 27), and the PKK predecessor ADYÖD, which included a number of leftists elements (Jongerden, 2023, p. 308).

Rebel predecessors may embody democratic practices that may influence rebel be-

[4]On the link between civil resistance and democratic practice see Celitakes (2016) and Pschorn (2019).

havior. For example, parent organizations of the KNU met at the All Karen Congress in Rangoon and therein "voted to establish a Karen National Union [...] which would campaign for an independent Karen homeland" (South, 2003, p. 104). Engagement with the international community by parents may also reflect organizational norms and behaviors that may carry forward to influence rebel tactics. For example, the MLEC, predecessor to the FLEC-R in Angola, petitioned the United Nations in their pursuit of independence for Cabinda, citing legal arguments around the Treaty of Simulambuco (Martin, 1977, p. 58).

In sum, we contend that rebel groups with nonviolent parent organizations should be more likely to engage in nonviolent tactics than those with other types of parent organizations, as they inherit organizational structures and repertoires comprised of nonviolent practices, norms of nonviolence and members socialized into nonviolent contentious politics. This leads us to our first hypothesis:

> H1: Rebel groups with nonviolent parent organizations are more likely to use nonviolent tactics compared to groups with other types of parent organizations.

We also explore a second empirical implication of our argument. Rebel groups with nonviolent parents may not only be more likely to use nonviolent tactics than groups with other parent types, but may also do so earlier on in a conflict. This is because they are already endowed with personnel that has experience in organizing nonviolent tactics, as well as organizational routines and norms geared towards nonviolent action at conflict onset. Thus, groups with nonviolent parents may enjoy a temporal advantage over groups with other types of parents, as they do not need to develop the organizational capabilities to use nonviolent tactics while already engaging in violent conflict.[5]

> H2: Rebel groups with nonviolent parent organizations use nonviolent tactics earlier after conflict onset than groups with other types of parent organizations.

[5]See Zaks (2025) on the challenges of building novel organizational capacities for rebel groups.

Data and Empirical Evaluation

To test our hypotheses, we utilize the FORGE (Braithwaite & Cunningham, 2020) and SRDP (Cunningham et al., 2020) datasets. Our study sample is a set of rebel groups included in both these datasets, which comprise rebel groups fighting over territory from 1989 to 2011. This includes 87 rebel groups in FORGE and SRDP, with 1,317 rebel group-year observations. In the analyses, we will utilize a cross-section of rebel groups to evaluate H1 and time-series cross-sectional (TSCS) data to evaluate H2.

The FORGE dataset provides information for our independent variable, identifying the organizational predecessors of rebel groups included in the Uppsala Conflict Data Program (UCDP).[6] Importantly, for our analysis we restrict the rebel groups from the FORGE data to those that have parent organizations. Thus, we do not include in our analysis groups that do not have a parent organization.[7] The SRDP dataset forms the basis of our key dependent variable, rebel use of nonviolent tactics. SRDP provides information on a range of violent and nonviolent contentious political activities for self-determination movement factions, including rebel groups.[8] Using an approach that combines automated string matching with manual coding, we match 111 of the SRDP factions with 87 UCDP actors recorded in the FORGE dataset.[9] In cases where multiple SRDP factions match a single rebel group in the FORGE data, we merge these observations to prevent redundancy in our dataset.[10]

Our sample is restricted to disputes over self-determination based on data considera-

[6]The UCDP includes organized actors challenging the state and leading to at least 25 battle-deaths in a given year.

[7]Only 17 (3.95%) of the groups recorded in the FORGE data do not have parent organizations. Although this number contrasts with data collected by Lewis (2023), who finds that 33% of rebel groups do not have a prior organization, her sampling strategy differs from FORGE: Her sample includes groups from Africa only and groups do not have to satisfy UCDP's 25 battle-related death criterion to be included.

[8]The SRDP only records nonviolent tactics the factions themselves use. It does not record nonviolent tactics used by a social movement aligned with a faction, as in Leventoğlu and Metternich (2018).

[9]SRDP factions are sometimes more granular than UCDP actors. For example, the UCDP groups all self-determination movement factions present in the SRDP dataset that are fighting for Kashmiri independence into the actor "Kashmir insurgents."

[10]For example, we match the SRDP factions ETA-P-M and ETA-M with the same UCDP actor, ETA.

tions. There are several unique features of these wars. First, rebels seek greater autonomy or territorial control rather than total control of the state. Second, they have a defined ethno-nationalist constituent base that they claim to represent, which is a bounded population. That said, we do not expect that the theorized mechanisms will apply to only these types of rebels. The legacies of parent organizations should also impact rebels that seek control of the state or other political reforms.

Our dependent variable *nonviolent action* is a dichotomous indicator that takes on a 1 if a rebel group used at least one nonviolent tactic in a given year and 0 otherwise.[11] Five different nonviolent tactics are recorded in the SRDP: economic noncooperation (such as boycotts), protests and demonstrations, nonviolent interventions (such as sit-ins), social noncooperation (such as hunger strikes) and political noncooperation (such as election boycotts). The SRDP data provide a yearly indicator for each of these five types of nonviolence for each rebel group. For example, Polisario in Morocco engaged in protests in 2011, thus the group has a positive coding on the use of nonviolence in this year. The Front for the Restoration of Unity and Democracy (FRUD) in Djibouti engaged in hunger strikes, a form of social noncooperation, in 1993.

While the SRDP dataset provides information on the use of nonviolent tactics across different types, it does not include information on the extent of nonviolence used in a year in terms of size of event or number of actions within categories. For example, a rebel group that organized a 1,000-person rally in one year and a rebel group that engaged in 15 sit-ins would both have a similar coding on "1" for nonviolence in that year. This is an important limitation for the analysis, and the findings presented should be interpreted with this in mind. The SRDP data allows us to examine use of nonviolence by rebels, but does not easily allow us to speak to the extent to which groups use nonviolence.

An additional important factor to consider in our use of these data is that the SRDP is primarily coded from open news sources. There are a number of challenges that arise

[11] See Figures 1 and 2 in the Online Appendix for temporal and spatial variation on our dependent variable. With the exception of the Americas our sample is global.

from using this type of data, although they are still widely considered the most feasible sources to construct datasets that enable comparative analysis on a global scale (Earl et al., 2004). Of particular interest, whether or not events get reported on has been linked to the use of violence (Barranco & Wisler, 1999), as well as the size of events (Mueller, 1997). In general, this means that nonviolence is harder to observe through the SRDP data collection process than violence. However, given that all of the groups in our sample are engaged in violent rebellion, these groups are likely to be getting a higher degree of media attention than wholly nonviolent actors, thus limiting to some extent the chance that bias in the data collection process systematically misses the use of nonviolence by rebels.

Rebel groups vary across cases and over time in their use of nonviolent tactics. Over half of the rebel groups in our sample (52 of the 87, or 60%) used nonviolent tactics at some point in the sample timeframe. None of these groups engaged in nonviolence in all of their active conflict years. In six cases, rebel groups use nonviolence at the outset of violent conflict.[12] About 35% of rebels that used nonviolence during war did so in the first five years of conflict, and the majority of nonviolence users did so before the ten year mark.

In order to evaluate our H1, we create two conceptualizations of our main independent variable, nonviolent parentage. As noted, data for these variables are drawn from the FORGE dataset which records information on the organizations that are direct predecessors of rebel groups recorded in the UCDP universe. Parent organizations are named and organized formally and serve a variety of functions: from trade unions and student groups to political parties (both formally participating in legislative politics and banned) and the country's armed forces or other rebel groups. We code five types of parent organizations as falling under the nonviolent parent category: labor or trade unions, religious organizations, student or youth groups, political parties and non-party political movements.

[12]These are AMB in Israel, NDA in Sudan, ZAPU in Zimbabwe, MFDC in Senegal, Serbian Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina in Bosnia, and MPA/Republic of Anjouan in the Comoro Islands.

These types of organizations frequently engage in nonviolent action against governments in their attempts to compel the government to accommodate their demands (Butcher et al., 2022; Dahlum, 2019; Lyon & Schaffner, 2021). This is also evident specifically for nonviolent parent organizations of rebel groups in our sample. For example, the Sudanese National Democratic Alliance (NDA) was formed by more than 50 Sudanese trade unions, among other organizations (Hassan, 1993). These trade unions were previously active in winning concessions from the government for their members via strikes in the 1970s and participated in the general strike against the Nimeiry regime in 1985, contributing to his removal from power (Berry, 1992; Hassan, 1993).

Similarly, Jam'iyyat-i Islami-yi Afghanistan was created by the Muslim Youth, a student group active prior to the conflict in Afghanistan. Before its leaders founded the rebel group, the Muslim Youth organized demonstrations on and around Kabul University's campus, often clashing with their communist counterparts (Roy, 1990, pp. 73–74). We find similar behavior among religious parent organizations. For example, the Kimbanguist Church is one of the religious organizations that helped form the Bundu dia Kongo rebel group in the Democratic Republic of Congo. The Kimbanguist Church was already active against the Belgian colonial regime in the Congo with demonstrations, among other tactics, and their founder had pledged a commitment to nonviolence (Gampiot, 2017, pp. 78–79).

Political party parent organizations also engaged in nonviolent action before transforming into armed groups. The National Democratic Party of Zimbabwe (then-Rhodesia) organized mass demonstrations against the white settler-colonialist regime before being banned and getting pushed underground (Gwakuba Ndlovu, 2015). More broadly, we find that social movement parents also appear to engage in nonviolence. For example, the MTSHA organized rallies and other activities to mobilize and politicize Oromos around their ethnic identity before the movement was banned. After its leaders were jailed and executed, members took up arms to found the OLF (Lata, 2000, pp. 191–192).

Based on these types of parent organizations our first independent variable is a dichotomous indicator, *nonviolent parent*, which takes on a 1 if the group emerged from a nonviolent parent and 0 otherwise. Yet, a rebel group can have more than one parent organization. For example, Sudan's NDA emerged from a coalition of political parties, trade unions, and the SPLA/M rebel group (Hassan, 1993). We expect that our proposed mechanisms will still hold if nonviolent organizations jointly form a rebel group together with other types of organizations, including existing rebel groups. The nonviolent parent still contributes personnel, organizational routines and behavioral norms to a rebel group that is formed jointly with other types of organizations. This legacy should still increase the likelihood that this group uses nonviolent tactics compared to rebels without any nonviolent parents. To account for multiple parentages of different types, we create a second indicator, *nonviolent parent ratio*, which measures the ratio of nonviolent parent organizations to the overall number of parent organizations.

About 30% of rebel groups in the sample (26 groups) emerged from at least one organization that was nonviolent. Of these 26 groups, seven have multiple parents of which at least one is a nonviolent parent. Table 1 shows the distribution of rebel groups by parentage and use of nonviolence. The use of nonviolence is prevalent both among groups with nonviolent parents and those with other types of parents. While just over half (51%) of rebels without nonviolent parents use nonviolence, the vast majority (85%) of rebels with nonviolent parents do so.

In our analyses, we present models both with and without control variables. As we note, there are few studies of rebel use of nonviolence, and even fewer that address when and why rebels might emerge from different types of actors, such as nonviolent parents. Ideally, our control variables would include factors that have been linked to both our independent and dependent variables (Dworschak, 2024). Given the limited empirical work, we control for a set of factors that other scholars (Hillesund & Holtermann, 2024; Keller, 2017; Krtsch, 2021) have argued to influence the likelihood of a rebel group using

Table 1: Rebel group use of nonviolent tactics by type of parentage.

	Nonviolent parent	Other parent(s)	Total
No nonviolence	4	30	34
Rebel use of nonviolence	22	31	53
Total	26	61	87

nonviolent tactics and address the extent to which these factors may have connections to rebel parentage.

We control for whether the group subscribes to a *leftist ideology*.[13] Groups with leftist ideologies may have a greater capacity to mobilize broader swaths of civilians than other groups and mobilization potential is often seen as key to successful nonviolence (Chenoweth & Stephan, 2011). Leftist ideology also forms the basis of political movements around the world (Herre, 2023).[14] We also include the variable *regime type* using the Polity2 score from the PolityIV dataset at the start of war, as regime type and the likelihood of nonviolent contentious action are closely linked (Stephan & Chenoweth, 2008). The ability of any individual or group to use nonviolent action is likely to be greater in more politically free regimes. Moreover, regime type is also likely to condition the types of organizations that are able to press the state for policy change. This can impact the types of parent organizations rebels can emerge from.

We also control for the possibility that the size of a rebel group's civilian constituency may influence the use of nonviolence in conflict, as larger constituencies may generate incentives for rebels to engage in nonviolent tactics and a large constituency may be able to put pressure on rebels to engage in more nonviolent actions. Constituency size may also impact the type of parent organization rebels emerge from, as demographic advantage may play a larger role in effecting political change (such as for political parties). Data for the variable *rebel constituency size ratio* are sourced from the SRDP and measures the ratio

[13]Ideology data is sourced from the FORGE dataset.

[14]Herre's (2023) examination of political leader ideology from 1945 to 2020 identifies 43% of leader-year observations as "leftist."

of rebel constituency size (based on ethno-nationalist identity) to the country's population at the starting year of the conflict.[15]

In addition, we control for several factors related to the dynamics of ongoing conflict in an additional model, as these have been argued to impact rebel use of nonviolence. We control for the level of civilian targeting by the rebel group, as lower levels of civilian victimization may increase the ability of rebels to mobilize civilians. Rebels that emerged from other armed actors may have different experiences with prior targeting of civilians that may also influence their capacity to mobilize civilians for nonviolence. The *rebel civilian targeting* variable is drawn from the best fatality estimate of the UCDP One-Sided Violence dataset (Eck & Hultman, 2007). Second, we include the variable *government civilian targeting*, which is operationalized like *rebel civilian targeting* but captures exclusively one-sided violence by the government. Greater targeting of civilians by the state may increase the willingness of civilians to support rebel nonviolent actions. Repressive environments, including those where states target everyday citizens, are more likely to see the emergence of rebel groups (Young, 2013).

Following Hillesund and Holtermann (2024), we include a control for *relative fatalities* (rebels versus government). This captures battlefield successes, which may increase the rebels' potential to mobilize civilians because they shift civilian expectations about rebel victory. The variable is operationalized as a count variable by subtracting government from rebel fatalities (Hillesund & Holtermann, 2024), using the UCDP GED dataset (Sundberg & Melander, 2013). Summary statistics for all variables used in the analyses can be found in Online Appendix Tables 1 and 2.

[15] As the data on constituency size only cover the years until 2005, we impute constituency count data for 2006-2011 using a linear extrapolation method. The ratio measure does not vary within actors over time and we thus use the existing values to impute missings.

Empirical Impact of Nonviolent Legacies

Table 2 presents the results of our regression analyses to test H1. As our dependent variable is dichotomous, we use logistic regression models for our estimation strategy. Model 1 tests the bivariate relationship between the binary measure of nonviolent parent organization and the use of nonviolent tactics. Model 2 includes controls for factors likely to impact both our independent and dependent variables (*regime type*, *rebel constituency size ratio* and *leftist ideology*). Model 3 additionally includes dynamic conflict factors operationalized as mean values over the conflict period. Models 4 through 6 provide similar analyses using the ratio of nonviolent parent organizations to all parent organizations as the rebel parentage independent variable.

The bivariate models and the models with different configurations of controls return positive and statistically significant coefficients for nonviolent parentage (both the dummy and ratio indicators). Rebels with nonviolent parent organizations are indeed more likely to employ nonviolence than those with other types of parentage (H1). This is consistent with our argument that these organizations will inherit structures and routines that make wartime nonviolence easier to employ. Our measure of regime type (Polity2 score) indicates that rebels starting in a more democratic context are more likely to use wartime nonviolence (Models 2 and 5). Rebels, and potential supporters, may anticipate a better reception from the government for wartime nonviolence than in less free contexts, where protests of all kinds are more regularly repressed. Yet, this effect washes out in Models 3 and 6. Neither rebel constituency size nor leftist ideology return statistically significant coefficients. Likewise, we do not see statistically significant effects of the measures of conflict dynamics related to civilian targeting and relative fatalities. However, little stock should be put in the non-findings of dynamic factors in Models 3 and 6, as these are conflict averages and do not capture changes during wartime. In Online Appendix Table 3, we provide a similar analysis with time-series data. The coefficients on nonviolent

Table 2: Logit regression models of rebel use of wartime nonviolence.

	Dependent variable: Nonviolent action					
	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5	Model 6
Nonviolent parent	1.672**	2.057**	2.133**			
	(0.609)	(0.694)	(0.660)			
Nonviolent parent ratio				1.813*	2.262**	2.340**
				(0.787)	(0.762)	(0.746)
Regime type		0.114*	0.103		0.118*	0.111
		(0.052)	(0.058)		(0.051)	(0.057)
Leftist ideology		1.830	1.810		1.850	1.760
		(1.453)	(1.410)		(1.438)	(1.391)
Rebel constituency size ratio		-0.173	-0.274		0.110	-0.151
		(2.766)	(2.817)		(2.714)	(2.763)
Rebel civilian targeting			0.017			0.019
			(0.019)			(0.019)
Government civilian targeting			-0.000			-0.000
			(0.002)			(0.002)
Relative fatalities			0.000			0.000
			(0.000)			(0.000)
Constant	0.033	-0.026	-0.092	0.058	-0.041	-0.127
	(0.435)	(0.486)	(0.511)	(0.442)	(0.486)	(0.514)
Observations	87	85	85	87	85	85

Notes: Standard errors in parentheses, clustered on country. * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$.

parentage remain positive and they retain statistical significance in half of the models. The coefficients on regime type retain significance.[16]

The legacies of nonviolent parentage have a substantial effect on wartime nonviolence. Examining the marginal effect of nonviolent parentage (based on Model 2), we see a predicted 38 percentage-point increase in the chance a rebel groups will use wartime nonviolence when the group has a nonviolent parent compared to not having a nonviolent parent. A move from the first to third quartile of the Polity2 measure (-7 to 6 in our sample)

[16]In this TSCS analysis we also see a positive and statistically significant impact of rebel constituency size.

Figure 1: Marginal effect of nonviolent parent ratio (Model 5).



leads to a 28 percentage-point increase in the chance that a rebel group will use wartime nonviolence.

We find that the greater the ratio of nonviolent parents a rebel group has, the more likely it is to use wartime nonviolence. Graphing the predicted marginal effect of the nonviolent parentage ratio (based on Model 5), Figure 1 shows a steadily increasing effect over the range of the data.

To evaluate our H2, which states that rebel groups with nonviolent parentage will use nonviolent tactics earlier in conflict than groups with other types of parents, we utilize a Cox Proportional Hazards model on TSCS data where the use of nonviolence is measured for each rebel group-year. This model examines the effects of different factors on the time to 'failure,' which is the first use of nonviolence by a rebel group.[17] For example, a rebel group that uses nonviolence in year four of a conflict has a faster time to failure than one

[17]Residuals tests indicate no violations of proportional hazard assumptions.

Table 3: Cox proportional hazards model.

Number of subjects = 63				Observations = 561	
Number of failures = 28				LR χ^2 (7) = 14.670	
Log likelihood = -69.079				Prob. > χ^2 = 0.041	
Variable	Hazard ratio	Standard error	z	P > |z|	[95% CI]
Nonviolent parent	5.807	2.911	3.510	0.000	[2.174, 15.510]
Leftist ideology	1.976	1.595	0.840	0.390	[0.406, 9.616]
Rebel civilian targeting (lag)	1.000	0.012	0.050	0.961	[0.978, 1.024]
Relative fatalities (lag)	1.000	0.001	0.210	0.833	[0.999, 1.002]
Rebel constituency size ratio	0.790	1.888	-0.100	0.922	[0.007, 85.269]
Government civilian targeting (lag)	0.999	0.001	-1.100	0.274	[0.997, 1.001]
Regime type (lag)	1.027	0.039	0.710	0.475	[0.954, 1.107]

which uses nonviolence in year ten. Table 3 shows the results of a Cox model on the first use of wartime nonviolence for rebel groups measured yearly. Groups that never used nonviolence are right-censored.

In support of H2, the results show that emerging from nonviolent parent organizations is associated with a faster time to failure. The hazard ratio for *nonviolent parent* is statistically significant at the 0.001 level.[18] Other covariates in turn do not attain statistical significance. Figure 2 shows the Kaplan-Meier survival plots for rebel groups with and without nonviolent parent organizations. The dashed line represents the chance of failure for rebels with at least one nonviolent parent. The solid line represents the survival curve for all other groups. Rebels with a nonviolent parent are likely to fail, i.e., use nonviolent tactics, much sooner (about five times) than rebel groups with other types of parents.

Further Analyses

The findings in Table 2 show consistent support for our proposition that rebels emerging from nonviolent organizations will be more likely to use nonviolence across two different

[18]This is also robust to a specification with bootstrapped standard errors (see Online Appendix Table 4).

conceptualizations of nonviolent parentage and including control variables drawn from the existing literature about nonviolence and rebels. To examine the sensitivity of these findings, we run a number of other specifications. First, we repeat the models in Table 2 using linear probability modeling in lieu of logistic regression (Online Appendix Table 5). The coefficients on nonviolent parentage remain positive and statistically significant in all models at the 95% confidence level. Additionally, as the Polity2 measure has been criticized for its inherent link to conflict behavior, we replace this with two alternative measures in different specifications. Online Appendix Table 6 shows the results of models using measures of the Varieties of Democracy (V-DEM) liberal democracy and polyarchy indicators, which capture the quality of liberal democracy and electoral democracy, respectively. These terms both return positive and significant coefficients, similar to our findings with Polity2. The measure of nonviolent parentage remains positive and statistically significant. Moreover, our measure of leftist ideology in Table 2 is relatively restrictive, including "leftist" but not communist groups. We reproduce our analyses in Online Appendix Table 7 with a measure that includes both communist and leftist groups. This combined measure returns a positive and significant coefficient, suggesting that these groups are more likely to employ nonviolence. The coefficients on rebel group nonviolent parentage remain positive and statistically significant.

We also address the dynamics of rebel groups having multiple parents more directly. About 19% of rebel groups in the sample emerge from multiple parents. In Online Appendix Table 8, we include a binary measure of whether the rebel group had multiple parents and a count of the number of parents in different models. Neither indicator returns a statistically significant coefficient on the use of nonviolence. Our measures of nonviolent parentage remain positive and significant.

We also probe the impact of rebel parentage on individual nonviolent tactics, thereby effectively disaggregating our dependent variable into its constituent parts. Online Appendix Table 9 displays this result. There was not sufficient variation for the outcome

Figure 2: Survival curves by parentage.



Notes: Dashed survival curve for nonviolent parentage, solid survival curve for other parentage.

on nonviolent intervention to run the model, however we find positive and partially statistically significant coefficients on rebel nonviolent parentage for the other nonviolent tactics. Protests and demonstrations as well as social noncooperation are not significant, while economic noncooperation and political noncooperation are significant at the 95% confidence level. This suggests that our positive and statistically significant main results are not driven by an individual type of nonviolent action.[19]

In addition to these further analyses, we evaluate the overall fit of our logistic regression from Model 3 in Table 2 with out-of-sample predictions.[20] By sequentially eliminating

[19]We also run a model leveraging the number of types of nonviolent tactics used by a rebel group that SRDP identifies as a dependent variable. This variable ranges from 0-5 and captures the tactical diversity of a rebel group regarding nonviolence. Analysis with a Poisson regression (Online Appendix Table 10) returns positive but not statistically significant coefficients on the nonviolent parentage terms. This suggests that having a nonviolent parent is not associated with tactical diversity regarding nonviolence in wartime.

[20]We follow Ward, Greenhill and Bakke (2010) and use k(4)-fold cross-validation. We split the data into four segments and utilize three segments to create a training set on which the model is re-estimated. The

factors from the model, we can compare the area under the curve (AUC) and thus the predictive power of each factor to a model with all factors.[21] The in-sample AUC for Model 2 in Table 2 is 0.790 and the out-of-sample AUC employing k(4)-fold cross-validation is 0.660. These AUC values on the full model suggest that it is not overfitting the data. The AUC value comparison for iterative elimination of factors is presented in Online Appendix Table 11. Three factors improve the predictive power of the model: nonviolent parentage, leftist ideology and government civilian targeting. For each of these, the removal of the factor leads to a drop in the AUC, which suggests their inclusion helps to improve predictions. The exclusion of the other variables leads to a slight increase in AUC.

Our analysis of observational data on rebel use of nonviolence shows substantial support for the role of nonviolent parentage in determining which rebels use nonviolent tactics in wartime. A drawback of this approach is that it does not speak to causal inference, as there may be key differences between the treated and untreated groups (i.e., those with nonviolent parents and those without) that act as confounders. To partially address this limitation, we employ nearest neighbor matching to analyze the impact of having nonviolent parentage. We include only regime type and constituency size at the outset of conflict for matching, which are not part of the dynamic conflict process and can be regarded as pretreatment variables (Online Appendix Table 12).[22] We continue to find a positive and statistically significant effect of having a nonviolent parent on the use of wartime nonviolence by rebels.

Discussion and Conclusion

In this article, we advance an argument that the legacies of rebel formation have lasting effects on rebels' behavior in wartime. Specifically, the inherited personnel, norms and

fourth segment is used as a test set to evaluate the predictive power of the model. This process is repeated ten times.

[21] The AUC is produced by plotting the rate of false positives to true positives in a receiver operator characteristic (ROC) plot.

[22] We do not include leftist ideology, which showed poor balance after matching.

capacities that come from nonviolent parent organizations create incentives for rebel leaders to employ nonviolent tactics in addition to their armed challenge to the state. Specific organizations that utilize nonviolent tactics are likely to transfer some of these skills to rebel groups that emerge from them, and we categorize these broadly as nonviolent parent organizations. These include labor or trade unions, religious organizations, student or youth groups, political parties and non-party political movements.

We provide a set of examples demonstrating the use of nonviolent actions among these different organizational parent types. Moreover, we highlight links between parent organizations and their subsequent rebel groups that suggest some continuity of personnel and practices. To evaluate our hypotheses, we examine the relationship between rebel parentage and the use of nonviolence through quantitative analysis. We find support for our hypotheses that rebels emerging from nonviolent parents are more likely to use nonviolence during wartime and that they use these tactics earlier after conflict onset than groups with other types of parents. This article contributes to the growing literature on the determinants of rebels' use of nonviolent tactics in civil conflict.

The evidence we have provided demonstrates a link between rebel parentage and the use of nonviolence. However, like most observational research, our analysis is limited in that it is unable to speak directly to our proposed mechanisms. While our argument advances several mechanisms through which the legacy of nonviolent parentage matters for nonviolent action in civil war, the quantitative analysis cannot adjudicate between these. That is, we cannot speak to how important the continuity of personnel is versus norms or practices in driving a greater use of nonviolence in wartime.

We identify several ways in which future works may expand upon our research. First, future work may probe the importance of each mechanism individually and thus address the key limitation of our analysis. Second, future research might study how mobilized civilians perceive the transformation of nonviolent social movements into rebel groups. How civilians perceive the organizational changes outlined here and how these

changes impact their willingness to turn out for protest or other acts of nonviolence remains understudied. Third, in some instances, rebels may explicitly reject the peaceful or conventional political struggle. Future work could explore how such rejections condition the legacies of nonviolent origins. Moreover, some parent organizations may continue to exist during conflict, or rebels could purposefully align or pledge themselves to other organizations during conflict. How might these organizations influence rebel behavior? Finally, we encourage the use of methodological approaches beyond observational studies, including experiments and qualitative work, to study nonviolent resistance in civil war and thus further advance our understanding of this important conflict phenomenon.

Acknowledgments

The authors would like to thank Danielle Jung, Minnie Joo, David Cunningham, Melek Hilal Eroğlu, Johannes Vüllers, Jessica Maves Braithwaite, Charles Butcher and three anonymous reviewers for their constructive feedback.

Data Availability Statement

The dataset and do-files for the empirical analysis in this article, along with the Online Appendix, are available at https://www.prio.org/journals/jpr/replicationdata. All analyses were conducted using Stata 16.

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Biographical Statement

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The Nonviolent Legacies of Rebel Group Origins

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Online Appendix

Summary Statistics

Figure 1: Use of nonviolent tactics over time.



Figure 2: Use of nonviolent tactics across countries.



Table 1: Summary statistics for cross-sectional data.

Variable	N	Mean	SD	Min.	Max.
Nonviolent action	87	0.609	0.491	0	1
Nonviolent parent	87	0.299	0.460	0	1
Nonviolent parent ratio	87	0.262	0.420	0	1
Regime type (start)	87	-0.563	6.624	-10	10
Leftist ideology	87	0.057	0.234	0	1
Rebel constituency size ratio (start)	85	0.116	0.115	0.001	0.413
Rebel civilian targeting (mean)	87	6.845	17.464	0	115.524
Government civilian targeting (mean)	87	89.579	144.454	0	839.800
Relative fatalities (mean)	87	-89.313	933.217	-8580	1100.286
V-DEM liberal democracy (start)	87	0.254	0.227	0.017	0.791
V-DEM polyarchy (start)	87	0.367	0.234	0.095	0.855
Communist and leftist ideology	87	0.207	0.407	0	1
Multiple parents	87	0.195	0.399	0	1
Number of parents	87	1.264	0.637	1	5
Economic noncooperation	87	0.241	0.430	0	1
Protest and demonstrations	87	0.506	0.503	0	1
Nonviolent interventions	87	1.264	0.637	1	5
Social noncooperation	87	0.172	0.380	0	1
Political noncooperation	87	0.299	0.460	0	1
Number of nonviolent tactics	87	1.149	1.262	0	5

Table 2: Summary statistics for TSCS data.

Variable	N	Mean	SD	Min.	Max.
Nonviolent action	1,317	0.260	0.439	0	1
Nonviolent parent	1,317	0.351	0.477	0	1
Nonviolent parent ratio	1,317	0.306	0.436	0	1
Regime type (lag)	1,264	1.137	6.149	-9	10
Leftist ideology	1,317	0.076	0.265	0	1
Rebel constituency size ratio	1,288	0.115	0.116	0.001	0.413
Rebel civilian targeting (lag)	1,263	8.724	45.315	0	794
Government civilian targeting (lag)	1,263	94.201	398.169	0	5801
Relative fatalities (lag)	1,263	-16.046	940.064	-30072	6151
V-DEM liberal democracy (lag)	1,317	0.294	0.259	0.012	0.821
V-DEM polyarchy (lag)	1,317	0.410	0.265	0.072	0.893
Communist and leftist ideology	1,317	0.251	0.434	0	1
Multiple parents	1,317	0.210	0.407	0	1
Number of parents	1,317	1.295	0.696	1	5
Economic noncooperation	1,317	0.059	0.236	0	1
Protest and demonstrations	1,317	0.205	0.404	0	1
Nonviolent interventions	1,317	0.047	0.212	0	1
Social noncooperation	1,317	0.056	0.230	0	1
Political noncooperation	1,317	0.042	0.200	0	1
Number of nonviolent tactics	1,317	0.409	0.815	0	5

Robustness Checks

Table 3: Logit regression models of rebel use of wartime nonviolence (TSCS data).

	Dependent variable: Nonviolent action					
	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5	Model 6
Nonviolent parent	0.248	0.391*	0.388*			
	(0.153)	(0.175)	(0.182)			
Nonviolent parent ratio				0.258	0.377*	0.346
				(0.166)	(0.184)	(0.190)
Regime type (lag)		0.120***	0.120***		0.118***	0.118***
		(0.016)	(0.017)		(0.016)	(0.017)
Leftist ideology		0.650	0.842*		0.626	0.803*
		(0.397)	(0.411)		(0.396)	(0.409)
Rebel constituency size ratio		2.389***	2.417***		2.437***	2.474***
		(0.680)	(0.697)		(0.677)	(0.695)
Rebel civilian targeting (lag)			-0.001			-0.001
			(0.002)			(0.002)
Government civilian targeting (lag)			-0.000			-0.000
			(0.000)			(0.000)
Relative fatalities (lag)			0.001			0.001
			(0.000)			(0.000)
Constant	0.869***	-0.074	-0.076	0.879***	-0.057	-0.049
	(0.151)	(0.214)	(0.225)	(0.150)	(0.213)	(0.224)
Observations	1,312	1,232	1,180	1,312	1,232	1,180

Notes: Standard errors in parentheses, clustered on country. * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$. Cubic splines included but not reported.

Table 4: Cox proportional hazards model with bootstrapped standard errors.

Number of subjects = 63				Observations = 561	
Number of failures = 28				Wald χ^2 (7) = 9.170	
Log likelihood = -69.079				Prob. > χ^2 = 0.240	
Variable	Hazard ratio	Standard error	z	P > |z|	[95% CI]
Nonviolent parent	5.807	3.887	2.630	0.009	[1.564, 21.565]
Leftist ideology	1.976	28.433	0.050	0.962	[1.11e-12, 3.51e+12]
Rebel civilian targeting (lag)	1.001	0.566	0.009	0.999	[0.330, 3.032]
Relative fatalities (lag)	1.000	0.003	0.050	0.959	[0.994, 1.007]
Rebel constituency size ratio	0.790	2.579	-0.070	0.943	[0.001, 473.047]
Government civilian targeting (lag)	0.999	0.001	-1.210	0.226	[0.997, 1.001]
Regime type (lag)	1.027	0.048	0.580	0.560	[0.938, 1.126]

Table 5: Linear probability models of rebel use of wartime nonviolence.

	Dependent variable: Nonviolent action					
	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5	Model 6
Nonviolent parent	0.338**	0.382**	0.387**			
	(0.115)	(0.116)	(0.115)			
Nonviolent parent ratio				0.356*	0.421**	0.423**
				(0.137)	(0.122)	(0.123)
Regime type		0.022*	0.020		0.023**	0.022*
		(0.008)	(0.010)		(0.008)	(0.010)
Leftist ideology		0.370	0.366		0.372	0.357
		(0.234)	(0.221)		(0.233)	(0.222)
Rebel constituency size ratio		0.008	-0.025		0.058	0.019
		(0.541)	(0.567)		(0.546)	(0.566)
Rebel civilian targeting			0.002			0.002
			(0.002)			(0.002)
Government civilian targeting			-0.000			0.000
			(0.000)			(0.000)
Relative fatalities			0.000*			0.000*
			(0.000)			(0.000)
Constant	0.508***	0.487***	0.481***	0.516***	0.487***	0.475***
	(0.109)	(0.103)	(0.109)	(0.111)	(0.102)	(0.111)
Observations	87	85	85	87	85	85
R^2	0.101	0.214	0.226	0.093	0.216	0.227

Notes: Standard errors in parentheses, clustered on country. * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$.

Table 6: Logistic regression models with alternative measures of democracy.

	DV: Nonviolent action	
	Model 1	Model 2
Nonviolent parent	2.316***	2.445***
	(0.628)	(0.660)
V-DEM liberal democracy	6.230***	
	(1.598)	
V-DEM polyarchy		6.323***
		(1.639)
Leftist ideology	2.324	2.499*
	(1.192)	(1.272)
Rebel constituency size ratio	-0.919	-0.764
	(2.425)	(2.395)
Rebel civilian targeting	0.009	0.006
	(0.016)	(0.016)
Government civilian targeting	0.002	0.002
	(0.002)	(0.002)
Relative fatalities	0.001	0.001
	(0.001)	(0.001)
Constant	-1.801**	-2.600***
	(0.596)	(0.774)
Observations	85	85

Notes: Standard errors in parentheses, clustered on country. * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$.

Table 7: Logistic regression models with alternative measure of ideology.

	DV: Nonviolent action	
	Model 1	Model 2
Nonviolent parent	1.866**	
	(0.690)	
Nonviolent parent ratio		2.062*
		(0.831)
Regime type	0.110	0.119*
	(0.057)	(0.056)
Communist and leftist ideology	1.914**	1.904*
	(0.733)	(0.750)
Rebel constituency size ratio	-0.252	-0.169
	(2.750)	(2.685)
Rebel civilian targeting	0.021	0.023
	(0.020)	(0.020)
Government civilian targeting	-0.000	0.000
	(0.002)	(0.002)
Relative fatalities	0.001*	0.001**
	(0.000)	(0.000)
Constant	-0.270	-0.300
	(0.495)	(0.496)
Observations	85	85

Notes: Standard errors in parentheses, clustered on country. * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$.

Table 8: Logistic regression models with measures of multiple parents.

	Dependent variable: Nonviolent action			
	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4
Nonviolent parent	2.167**	2.134**		
	(0.676)	(0.700)		
Nonviolent parent ratio			2.347**	2.308**
			(0.767)	(0.749)
Regime type	0.107	0.103	0.112	0.107
	(0.060)	(0.060)	(0.059)	(0.059)
Leftist ideology	1.812	1.810	1.754	1.787
	(1.416)	(1.416)	(1.400)	(1.407)
Rebel constituency size ratio	-0.082	-0.270	-0.081	-0.387
	(2.855)	(2.872)	(2.804)	(2.856)
Rebel civilian targeting	0.018	0.017	0.019	0.019
	(0.019)	(0.019)	(0.019)	(0.019)
Government civilian targeting	-0.000	-0.000	0.000	-0.000
	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)
Relative fatalities	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Multiple parents	-0.365		-0.119	
	(0.608)		(0.571)	
Number of parents		-0.005		0.233
		(0.431)		(0.409)
Constant	-0.069	-0.087	-0.118	-0.362
	(0.503)	(0.542)	(0.504)	(0.531)
Observations	85	85	85	85

Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$.

Table 9: Logistic regression models on individual nonviolent tactics.

	Dependent variable			
	Economic noncooperation	Protests and demonstrations	Social noncooperation	Political noncooperation
	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4
Nonviolent parent	1.306	1.268*	1.240	1.087*
	(0.732)	(0.552)	(0.670)	(0.539)
Regime type	0.231**	0.074	0.047	0.124*
	(0.080)	(0.048)	(0.056)	(0.052)
Leftist ideology	1.779	2.043	1.681	0.183
	(1.049)	(1.344)	(1.535)	(0.678)
Rebel constituency size ratio	4.471	2.541	4.429	5.163
	(3.538)	(2.636)	(2.850)	(2.664)
Rebel civilian targeting	0.031	0.013	-0.035	0.046*
	(0.020)	(0.012)	(0.019)	(0.020)
Government civilian targeting	-0.010	0.001	-0.008	-0.000
	(0.007)	(0.002)	(0.005)	(0.003)
Relative fatalities	0.032	0.001	0.010***	0.000
	(0.022)	(0.001)	(0.003)	(0.000)
Constant	-2.517**	-0.912	-2.262**	-2.203***
	(0.782)	(0.485)	(0.765)	(0.492)
Observations	85	85	85	85

Notes: Standard errors in parentheses, clustered on country. * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$.

Table 10: Poisson regression models with number of nonviolent tactics.

	DV: Number of nonviolent tactics	
	Model 1	Model 2
Nonviolent parent	0.371	
	(0.268)	
Nonviolent parent ratio		0.451
		(0.285)
Regime type	0.058**	0.060**
	(0.022)	(0.022)
Leftist ideology	0.504	0.512
	(0.359)	(0.361)
Rebel constituency size ratio	1.127	1.181
	(1.145)	(1.121)
Rebel civilian targeting	0.006*	0.007*
	(0.003)	(0.003)
Government civilian targeting	-0.000	-0.000
	(0.001)	(0.001)
Relative fatalities	0.000	0.000
	(0.000)	(0.000)
Constant	-0.218	-0.241
	(0.271)	(0.276)
Observations	85	85

Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$.

Table 11: Out-of-sample k-fold cross validation results.

Factor excluded	AUC	Difference	Effect on model performance
None (full model)	0.660		
Nonviolent parent	0.546	-0.114	increased model performance
Regime type	0.683	0.024	decreased model performance
Leftist ideology	0.594	-0.066	increased model performance
Constituency size	0.699	0.039	decreased model performance
Rebel civilian targeting	0.732	0.073	decreased model performance
Government civilian targeting	0.654	-0.006	increased model performance
Relative fatalities	0.739	0.080	decreased model performance

Table 12: Nearest neighbor matching analysis, treatment = nonviolent parent.

Treatment-effects estimation				Observations = 92	
Estimator: nearest-neighbor matching				Matches: requested = 1	
Outcome model: matching				min. = 1	
Distance metric: Mahalanobis				max. = 3	
	Coefficient	AI Robust SE	z	P > |z|	[95% CI]
ATE (1 vs 0)	0.383	0.099	3.870	0.000	[0.189, 0.577]

Notes: Matching variables are Polity2 score and rebel constituency size at conflict onset.